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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
nvironmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues have become particularly important in recent 
years for investors, spurring companies to increase their efforts at being socially responsible. Many 
leading publicly traded firms are releasing more information about their ESG efforts. This trend is 
particularly true for social issues, which have become more prominent amid widespread concerns about 
race relations, law enforcement, and the pandemic. 
In the absence of a structured framework to report and monitor firms’ ESG efforts, the burden lies on 
companies to communicate on their initiatives and on investors to research them. New technologies, such 
as big data analysis or AI, can help process a larger set of information from different sources such as firms’ 
communication strategies or other alternative sources. However, there is a need to define a core set of 
variables that would capture these efforts as part of a long-term strategy. ESG rating agencies could then 
process this information and provide their assessment of the firms.   
In this report, we show that a standard set of variables would partially resolve inconsistencies and lack of 
uniform standards among rating providers, which often confuses investors. Furthermore, we dissociate the 
impact of the rating agencies’ different focus on E, S, or G from that of using non-standardized data. 
While the former, if properly disclosed, can be useful as it allows investors to choose what rating will align 
more with their preferences, the latter necessarily requires harmonization of the data. 
Using publicly available information, we illustrate how difficult it is to understand or predict some of the 
existing ratings. Yet we are also able to identify some commonalities. All ratings agree on the worst 
performers. They also reach some consensus when measuring risks arising from governance factors, 
especially for Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy and Management. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Strategy includes variables that reflect a company’s practices to communicate that it integrates economic 
(financial), social, and environmental dimensions into its daily decisions. Management includes variables 
that measure a company’s commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice corporate 
governance principles. 
Overall, our study has two main implications in assessing how well-equipped firms are to address ESG 
risks. First, there is a need for data standardization, starting with establishing common disclosure 
standards for ESG worldwide. The coordination of data collection would reduce the reporting burden for 
E 
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firms, leading to improved information quality. The goal is not to add to the existing efforts but to 
consolidate and standardize the data collection efforts. This would increase firms’ participation while 
improving the rating agencies’ credibility with investors. 
The second implication of our study is the importance of transparency in the methodologies used to 
calculate the rating. In other words, are E, S, and G factors equally important? Or does the rating focus 
mostly on one of them? Each method uses a different set of weights to aggregate data, which leads to a 
different rating, even when using the same data. Rating agencies’ different emphases can be informative 
as long as the agencies are clear about which ESG issues they prioritize and to what degree. Such 
transparency will allow investors, firms, and other users to decide which rating aligns best with their 
priorities.  
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2. INTRODUCTION 
Asset owners and managers are increasingly incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
factors into their financial analysis and decisions. According to the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 
(GSIA), an international agency that collects information across Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand, the value of assets under management with an explicit ESG mandate reached 
US $30.7 trillion at the beginning of 2018, an impressive 34 percent increase relative to 2016. Investment 
strategies that explicitly incorporate ESG criteria now command a significant fraction of all professionally 
managed assets across all these regions, ranging from about 18 percent in Japan to more than 50 percent 
in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (see Figure 1.b).1 
Figure 1. Professionally Managed Assets with an ESG Mandate 
a) Fraction of Global ESG Investing by 
Region (as of 2018) 
 
Source: GSIA (2019) 
b) Fraction of Professionally Managed Assets with 
ESG Mandate by Region, 2018 
 
Source: GSIA (2019) 
 
                                                 
1. The volume of assets under management with an ESG focus can vary a lot depending on what is included. The numbers in the GSIA 
report should be considered as broad estimates, as they include multiple investment strategies. 
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However, ESG-focused funds remain a low percentage of total assets under management at the world’s 
largest asset managers (see Table 1). The lack of offerings may be one of the explanations (see Figure 2 
and Appendix 1). 
 
The increasing focus on ESG investing has spurred an increase in the number and influence of ESG rating 
agencies. By providing clear, cost-effective, and consistent information about companies’ ESG 
performance, these agencies can play a crucial role in helping funds and other investment groups 
pinpoint firms that meet their ESG philosophies and standards. Moreover, an independent assessment of 
a company’s ESG performance can also present companies with an opportunity to differentiate 
themselves, potentially influencing them to adopt better practices to avert downgrades or improve their 
scores.2 
Some market participants remain skeptical of the value of ESG rating agencies’ information. A recent 
survey conducted by Sustainalytics, a major provider of ESG research and ratings, found that many 
                                                 
2. For an analysis of this “monitoring effect” in a corporate governance context, see Grimminger and Di Benedetta (2013). 
 
Figure 2. Funds Satisfying Basic Investment Screen: ESG-Focused Funds versus Overall Category 
 
 
Note: Out of 288 ESG-focused funds identified by Morningstar in the US, only 104 would pass a simple investment screen commonly 
employed by fund-of-fund managers: at least three years of historical returns and a fund size over US$50 million (Lauricella, 2020). 
 
Source: Morningstar Direct (2020) 
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investors regularly rely on ratings to inform their decisions. Yet, they find them difficult to use and 
sometimes are frustrated by them.3 Inconsistencies in the information used and lack of comparability 
across ratings have particularly confused investors and become a barrier to greater adoption of ESG 
investing.4 These discrepancies across ESG ratings affect company managers, who may face less urgency 
to improve their ESG performance and identify appropriate strategies to do so. 
Differences across ESG scores can naturally emerge if rating providers adopt different definitions of ESG 
performance. Some agencies, for example, may equate ESG performance with a company’s compliance 
with specific ethical standards. In contrast, others may emphasize a company’s ability to manage 
financially material risks and opportunities arising from ESG factors. To a certain extent, the availability of 
ratings with different definitions is natural, given the subjective nature of ESG criteria. But more 
importantly, it might be required to satisfy investors and asset managers with different needs and 
motivations. Agencies do not have to agree on a single definition but they should focus on standardizing 
data, labeling ratings more clearly, and ensuring they are transparent about their objectives. Such 
priorities would allow market participants to differentiate products better and to determine whether a 
particular definition aligns with their goals. 
Inconsistencies across ESG rating agencies are not only an issue of definitions. At least two other reasons 
can lead rating providers to score the same company differently. First, rating providers may disagree on 
how to measure the same ESG factor. Despite efforts by multiple standard-setting organizations, there is 
no universally accepted approach to measuring non-financial indicators. Rating agencies employ 
hundreds of ESG-related variables. Some come from company reports and regulatory filings and, 
therefore, should be consistent across agencies. Yet many others come through interviews or 
questionnaires and third-party independent reports with potentially conflicting approaches. Second, even 
if agencies agree on how to measure different ESG-related factors, each ESG agency has developed its 
own methodology to decide what ESG-related indicators to consider and how to aggregate them into an 
overall score. 
Besides documenting the extent of the disagreement among ESG scores, we provide insights into the 
drivers behind the inconsistencies. We contrast the impact of the data and of the methodologies. We 
                                                 
3. Wong and Petroy (2020). 
4. BNP Paribas (2019). 
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agree that the lack of data standardization is an issue for both investors and assessed firms, and it should 
be resolved by harmonizing the data collected and streamlining the process. However, differing 
methodologies are not necessarily a negative thing if they reflect each rating agency’s prioritization or 
specialization in a particular dimension (E, S, or G). However, agencies must be transparent about what 
they are offering users and regarding how they arrived at the assessment. Overall, we hope to inform 
market participants on how to contextualize and critically evaluate discrepancies in ESG scores and offer 
useful information on how to address them.  
Our analysis focuses on rating agencies that employ the same definition of ESG performance: a company’s 
ability to manage financially material risks and opportunities arising from ESG factors. This allows us to 
concentrate on differences in how agencies measure ESG factors and their methodologies for aggregating 
them into a single score.  
We shed light on the sources of disagreement among ESG ratings using an indirect approach. Our indirect 
method relies on machine learning techniques to identify and estimate the relationship between the ESG 
ratings and publicly available explanatory variables, which do not (necessarily) coincide with the ones used 
by the rating agencies. We then compare the relationships among the rating of three agencies using 
various methods. Finally, we assess the ability of our estimated ratings to replicate the disagreement 
among the agencies’ ratings. 
While all the agencies in our study use the same definition of ESG performance, their ratings strongly 
coincide only for the worst performers, which represent a relatively small number of firms. Overall, the 
substantial discrepancies among rating providers cannot be easily explained based on information readily 
available to investors. 
Our findings underscore the importance of data standardization and the necessity for agencies to be 
transparent regarding the method they used and the information they prioritize in their ESG assessment. 
Addressing these two issues will enable companies and investors to make more sense of the ratings and 
use the information about ESG factors to make better decisions.  
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. To establish common terminology, we begin with a 
discussion of the definition of ESG investing. We then document the extent of disagreement over ESG 
scores among the three major rating agencies at different levels of data aggregation. Next, we use 
9* 
machine learning techniques to understand better how the various rating agencies assess a company’s 
ESG performance based on a set of publicly available explanatory variables. Finally, we offer some 
conclusions drawn from our analysis.  
 
Table 1.  Assets under Management (AUM) in ESG-Focused Funds 
Company 
AUM 
($US Billions) 
ESG Investment 
($US Billions) 
ESG AUM  
Percentage 
BlackRock $6,470.00 $17.58 0.27% 
Vanguard $6,200.00 $9.54 0.15% 
UBS $3,260.00 $0.29 0.01% 
Fidelity $2,900.00 $0.67 0.02% 
State Street $2,690.00 $0.17 0.01% 
Allianz $2,490.00 $0.21 0.01% 
Capital Group $2,060.00 $0.00 0.00% 
JP Morgan Asset Management $1,900.00 $0.08 0.00% 
Goldman Sachs $1,859.00 $0.13 0.01% 
Bank of New York Mellon $1,800.00 $0.36 0.02% 
PIMCO $1,780.00 $1.96 0.11% 
Amundi $1,653.00 $0.32 0.02% 
Prudential Financial $1,481.00 $0.00 0.00% 
AXA Group $879.00 $0.00 0.00% 
Morgan Stanley $552.00 $6.72 1.22% 
Note: Funds classified as ESG explicitly stated in their mandates that the investments were chosen primarily for their ESG-risk 
mitigating characteristics. Keywords in the primary investment mandate also include impact investing, gender/ethnic diversification, 
and environmental sustainability. 
 
Source: Morningstar Direct (2020) 
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BOX 1. ESG SCORE LEVELS AND FINANCIAL VARIABLES  
This box illustrates the relationship between ESG score levels and some widely used financial variables 
for the studied group of companies.  
After sorting the firms from the largest (10th decile) to the smallest (1st decile) based on their market 
capitalization, Figure 3 plots the average Beta (a measure of a particular asset’s volatility relative to the 
risk of general systemic market movement) and the average ESG scores for the three rating agencies. All 
three rating agencies award higher average scores to larger companies. These same firms show more 
resiliency (lower Beta) to risks, including ESG ones. 
Figure 3. ESG Scores and Beta by Market Capitalization Decile 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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3. WHAT IS ESG INVESTING? 
Although there is no universally accepted definition, ESG investing is widely understood as an investment 
approach that looks beyond traditional financial indicators by considering environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) factors in the selection and management of an investment portfolio. In various ways, 
many investors have already been incorporating ESG issues into their investment frameworks for some 
time. The modern reference to ESG investing, however, denotes a more explicit, systematic integration of 
ESG factors into the investment process, as opposed to a more informal, less structured approach. 
Investors Can Have Multiple Motivations 
Investors integrate ESG factors into their financial decisions for various (not mutually exclusive) reasons. 
(See Box 2 for a list of factors commonly referred to as ESG). 
 Some investors may consider that ESG data can help paint a broader picture of a company’s 
operating environment. Accordingly, they rely on ESG investing to identify and manage risks and 
opportunities that they cannot easily detect through standard financial analysis—that is, as a 
source of financial value. According to Dan Hanson, former managing director at BlackRock, “ESG 
is a proxy for risk that is not priced in, and companies that better manage these risks can deliver 
returns with greater certainty …”5 Reducing exposure to polluters or companies with poor waste 
management policies, for example, can help mitigate regulatory risk, whereas screening for good 
social practices (such as workplace culture, human rights protection, or corporate community 
engagement) can reduce exposure to scandals that could damage a company’s reputation.6 
 Other investors rely on ESG investing to meet their values (e.g., ethical, religious, political, or 
cultural) or to promote specific environmental, social, or governance outcomes they deem 
desirable. Investors, for instance, may integrate ESG factors into their financial decisions to 
identify and exclude companies engaging in practices they find morally questionable, including 
low labor standards or human rights violations. These investors might seek to advance their non-
financial objectives without hampering financial objectives. In some cases, they might even be 
                                                 
5. Cited in Koehler and Hespenheide (2013). 
6. For studies on the relationship between ESG performance and profitability, see Friede et al. (2015) and, more recently, Verheyden et 
al. (2016). 
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willing to sacrifice financial returns to achieve their non-financial goals. A recent survey conducted 
by UBS among asset owners across 46 countries found that “doing good for society and the 
environment” is among the top four drivers behind ESG investing.7 
 And still others, such as institutional investors or financial advisors acting on behalf of a third 
party, may rely on ESG criteria to satisfy specific legal requirements. One of the world’s largest 
investment funds, for example, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, is mandated to 
avoid companies that contribute to or are responsible for “serious or systematic human rights 
violations, … serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict, severe 
environmental damage, … gross corruption, [or] other particularly serious violations of 
fundamental ethical norms.”8 
Multiple Labels for Similar Issues 
Despite its growing popularity, there are substantial terminological and conceptual inconsistencies 
surrounding ESG investing. Phrases such as sustainable, responsible, or socially responsible investing are 
sometimes conflated or used interchangeably with the term ESG investing. The broad array of terms that 
describe various ESG approaches and a lack of consistency in their use have confused investors. A recent 
survey conducted by State Street Global Advisors found that over half of those investors already 
implementing some type of ESG strategy within their portfolio were struggling with a lack of clarity 
around ESG terminology in their organizations.9 
To reduce confusion among investors, and because the common theme underlying all the different labels 
is an emphasis on ESG issues, we believe that the more neutral term, ESG investing, is appropriate. 
Accordingly, we see ESG investing as an umbrella term for an investment approach that involves some 
type of environmental, social, or governance consideration that can have various motivations and that, 
depending on the investor’s goals, resources, and circumstances, may involve different strategies.10 
                                                 
7. See, for example, Fritsch (2019). 
8. Norway’s Ministry of Finance (2019). 
9. State Street Global Advisors (2018). 
10. For a detailed discussion on how to incorporate ESG factors into the investment process, see Grim and Berkowitz (2018). 
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BOX 2. ESG FACTORS  
Broadly defined, environmental factors focus on a company’s environmental impact, social factors 
examine how it manages relationships with different stakeholders (such as customers, employees, 
suppliers, and the communities within which it operates), and governance factors deal with a company’s 
leadership, internal controls, and shareholder rights.  
ESG factors cover a wide range of topics. The relevant issues are likely to depend on the company being 
analyzed, its industry, and, ultimately, on the investor’s preferences and objectives. For these reasons, it 
should not be surprising that a definitive list of ESG factors does not exist. 
 Table 2: Examples of Well-Known ESG factors 
Environmental  Social  Governance 
- Climate change policies, 
plans, and disclosure 
practices 
- Air and water pollution 
- Deforestation 
- Biodiversity impact 
- Water stress 
- Waste and hazardous 
materials management 
- Usage of renewable 
energy 
 - Community 
engagement 
- Human rights 
- Labor practices 
- Product safety  
- Data security and 
customer privacy  
- Diversity and inclusion 
- Customer relations 
- Ethical supply chain 
sourcing 
- Management structure 
- Executive compensation 
- Board composition 
- Business integrity  
- Transparency 
- Bribery and corruption 
- Lobbying 
- Whistleblower schemes 
- Shareholder relations 
 
Source: Milken Institute (2020) 
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4. DISAGREEMENT AMONG ESG RATINGS 
Our analysis considers three major rating agencies that emphasize the financial impact of ESG factors 
when measuring a company’s ESG performance: RobecoSAM, Sustainalytics, and Thomson Reuters.11 
Considering only ratings that agree on a definition of ESG performance allows us to concentrate on the 
different ways agencies measure ESG factors and the methodologies they use to aggregate them into a 
single score. Our sample contains annual information on 943 firms for the year 2018, the latest for which 
all three ESG scores were available.12 The data were collected from Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon.  
A simple glance at the distributions of ESG ratings (see Figure 4) confirms that the agencies’ assessments 
of the firms are different: Most of Thomson Reuters scores are concentrated around high values, between 
50 and 80, while RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics spread them mostly evenly between 10 and 90.  
                                                 
11. According to Gaffuri (2017), RobecoSAM’s methodology seeks to identify “… any [ESG] factor which might have a present or 
future impact on companies’ value drivers, competitive position, and thus on long-term shareholder value creation.” According to 
Sutainalytics (2019), its rating “measure[s] the degree to which a company’s economic value is at risk driven by ESG factors.” And 
according to Thomson Reuters (2018), its rating helps to “easily identify companies with … exposure to ESG risks.” 
12. To construct our sample of firms, we started with the 2,000 largest companies by market capitalization. We then excluded 
companies for which we were unable to procure information on all three different ESG scores, as well as companies for which a 
substantial fraction of the explanatory variables used in the following section was missing. For multiannual scores, we consider the 
last available for 2018. 
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Table 3. Correlations between ESG Ratings 
Pair of Scores Correlation 
RobecoSAM vs. Sustainalytics 0.72 
RobecoSAM vs. Thomson Reuters 0.65 
Sustainalytics vs. Thomson Reuters 0.65 
Note: The correlations are the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
 
The pairwise correlations, reported in Table 3, confirm that RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics tend to agree 
the most in their assessment with a correlation of 0.72. This level of agreement is significantly lower than 
the one usually encountered among credit ratings, with an average correlation of 0.986.13  
                                                 
13. For other studies reporting correlations among ESG rating agencies, see Berg et al. (2020), Gibson et al. (2019), and State Street 
Global Advisors (2019). 
Figure 4. ESG Score Distributions 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon (2020) 
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4.1. DISAGREEMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 
A look at the economic sectors (with Figure 5 for correlations and Table 4 for a short description of the 
sectors including their unique regulatory and financial characteristics) allows us to derive more granular 
insights into the differences: 14  
 The overall level of agreement among ratings (i.e., the average pairwise correlation between ESG 
scores) varies substantially across sectors, ranging from 0.50 in Energy to 0.77 in Technology. 
 The highest within-sector heterogeneity in the level of agreement among ratings occurs in the 
sector with the lowest correlation, Energy.15 The companies in this sector may be harder to 
evaluate, as they are highly regulated or because significant investments in infrastructure make it 
harder to identify the relevant ESG risks and the appropriate strategies to deal with those risks.  
 Sectors with a higher level of agreement among ratings, such as Financials, Technology, and 
Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services, seem to place less emphasis on environmental factors, 
particularly the first two. This insight could indicate, for example, more consistency across rating 
agencies on the appropriate way to measure financially material risks arising from social and 
governance factors.  
Overall, the three rating agencies give very different ESG scores, with a correlation below 0.5, to more than 
60 percent of the firms. In contrast, they have a very similar assessment, with a correlation of 0.95 or more, 
for only 10 percent of the firms, the worst-performing ones. (See Appendices 3 and 4 for an analysis of 
disagreement by market capitalization decile and at the firm level). 
Substantial discrepancies in ESG scores across rating agencies is a problem for both investors and 
companies. Investors may have difficulties in integrating ESG factors into their portfolios in a manner that 
reflects their preferences. Companies could be discouraged from improving their ESG performance, as 
                                                 
14. We use the Thomson Reuters Business Classification to assign each company into one of ten different economic sectors. 
15. The higher heterogeneity in the Energy sector should be taken carefully, for it is also one of the sectors with the lowest number of 
observations (48). 
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they may not be able to identify an appropriate strategy, or they may find the outcome too uncertain and 
not worth the investment.  
 
Table 4. Economic Sectors: Description and Unique Features 
 Sector Description Unique Financial and Regulatory Characteristics 
Basic 
Material 
(68) 
Companies involved in the discovery, 
development, and processing of raw 
materials, including mining and metal 
refining, chemicals, and packaging (e.g., 
Ecolab, Dupont, Dow).   
Companies in this sector supply most of the materials 
used in construction. Thus, they are sensitive to changes 
in the business cycle and tend to thrive when the 
economy is strong, exhibiting a rather high Beta of 1.13 
on average.  
Figure 5. Correlations between ESG Scores by Economic Sector 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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Consumer 
Cyclical 
(120) 
Companies that produce elastic or non-
essential goods and services purchased 
by individuals and households such as 
automobiles (e.g., Ford, GM), specialty 
retailers (e.g., Amazon), hotels and 
entertainment (e.g., Marriott 
International), and media-publishing (e.g., 
ViacomCBS).  
Compared to the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector, the 
Consumer Cyclical sector has higher profit margins, but 
its demand is more sensitive to the business cycle. The 
sector has a reactive Beta to the market, at 1.17. 
Consumer Non-Cyclical companies trade at the lowest 
sector average of 2.1x sales.  
Consumer 
Non-Cyclical 
(82) 
Companies that produce inelastic or 
essential goods and services purchased 
by individuals and households. Industries 
within the sector include food and drug 
retailers (e.g., Walmart), food and tobacco 
producers (e.g., General Mills), beverage 
producers (e.g., Coca-Cola), and personal 
and household products/services (e.g., 
Procter & Gamble).  
Within the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector, businesses 
provide goods/services that have a relatively inelastic 
demand. Due to this inelasticity, Consumer Non-Cyclical 
companies can employ larger debt levels relative to 
other sectors, utilizing leverage to increase return on 
equity (ROE). Consumer Non-Cyclicals exhibit a 
comparatively smaller average Beta at just 0.65.   
Energy 
(48) 
The Energy sector includes companies 
involved in the exploration and 
development of oil or gas reserves, oil 
and gas drilling, and refining (e.g., Exxon 
Mobil, Chevron, Occidental Petroleum, 
Schlumberger).  
Companies in the Energy sector incur large capital 
expenditure costs to create and maintain core business 
activity infrastructure. Energy providers are extremely 
susceptible to output pricing and supply and demand 
shocks, leading to the highest average Beta across 
sectors (at 1.36). The industry also pays the largest 
dividend yield to investors, averaging 7.06 percent on an 
annual basis.  
Financials 
(226) 
The largest represented sector in the S&P 
500 by number of firms. It includes large 
banking institutions (e.g., JPMorgan 
Chase & Co., Bank of America), payment 
services (e.g., American Express), as well 
as insurance and asset management 
institutions (e.g., BlackRock and MetLife). 
The Financials sector treats debt fundamentally different 
from all other economic sectors, utilizing it as a 
revenue-generating asset from a lender/investor 
perspective. This feature creates the widest discrepancy 
between enterprise value and market capitalization at a 
2.09:1 ratio among the economic sectors. Financials are 
more volatile than the overall market, with an average 
Beta of 1.08. ROE for the sector was 12.01 percent, 
below the sector-agnostic average of 27 percent. The 
Financials sector is also highly regulated and therefore 
affected by governmental decisions.  
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Health Care 
(83) 
The Health Care sector consists of 
companies that provide medical services 
(e.g., UnitedHealth Group, Cigna), health-
care equipment and devices (e.g., 
Johnson & Johnson, Thermo Fisher 
Scientific), and 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology (e.g., 
Gilead, Pfizer, Merck).   
Because of the necessity of its products, the Health Care 
sector has a Beta (.98) that most closely mirrors the S&P 
500, while generating the second-highest average ROE 
at 31 percent. Influenced by outliers within the highly 
volatile biotechnology industry, the Health Care sector 
has by far the largest average EV/EBIT valuation multiple 
at 111x, ranging from 7x to 7,152x. The sector also 
exhibits the second-highest average price-to-earnings 
ratio at 38, partly due to the highly regulated Food and 
Drug Administration approval process (with successful 
drug patents allowing for monopolies on certain 
drug/treatment advancements that possess pricing 
power to recoup R&D costs).  
Industrials 
(132) 
Enterprises that produce machinery (e.g., 
Boeing, Caterpillar), passenger and 
material transportation (e.g., Delta, UPS), 
and aerospace and defense (e.g., 
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon) all fall under 
the Industrials umbrella.  
The most diverse sector in terms of products or services, 
Industrials exhibits the largest range of ROE in the S&P 
500, returning anywhere between -225 percent and 
+766 percent. Industrials also exhibit comparatively 
lower valuation multiples on average: 14x EV/EBITDA, 
16x EV/EBIT, 2.8x EV/Sales, and 21 P/E.  
Technology 
(96) 
The Technology sector offers a wide 
range of products and services for both 
customers and other businesses. 
Industries within the Technology sector 
include software and IT (e.g., Microsoft), 
communications and networking (e.g., 
Facebook), computers, phones, 
household electronics (e.g., Apple), and 
office equipment (e.g., Cisco).  
The Technology sector is unique in many ways. Contrary 
to other sectors, profit takes a back seat to growth, and 
operating metrics are not as pertinent to the valuation 
discussion. Because of this growth focus, operators in 
this sector tend to shy away from debt financing, 
exhibiting a comparatively low 82 percent debt-to-
equity ratio on average for 2018. The propensity for 
equity financing provides for larger cash-on-hand in the 
balance sheet, making it the only sector in the S&P 500 
whose average market capitalization is greater than the 
enterprise value of the firm. Strong cash infusions 
through equity offerings allow tech companies to 
possess the largest average current and quick ratios on 
the balance sheet, at 2.35 and 2.14, respectively. The 
Technology sector is characterized by high average 
valuation multiples, trading at 22x EBITDA, 5.5x sales, 
and 52x earnings, the highest of any sector.  
Telecom 
(29) 
The Telecommunications sector consists 
of companies that transmit data in words, 
voice, audio, or video globally (e.g., AT&T, 
Verizon, T-Mobile, CenturyLink).   
While the sector remains concentrated, it is moving 
toward a more decentralized system with less regulation 
and barriers to entry. Beta is much lower than average at 
.62. Because firms often operate on a subscription and 
revenue recognition model, dividend yields are larger 
than in most other economic sectors at an average of 
5.52 percent yield per year, second only to Energy.  
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Utilities 
(59) 
The Utilities sector includes companies 
that provide basic amenities, such as 
water, sewage services, electricity, dams, 
and natural gas (e.g., Nextera Energy, 
Duke Energy, Edison International, 
Sempra).  
Utilities are part of the public service landscape and, 
therefore, heavily regulated. It typically offers stable and 
consistent dividends (4.47 percent), coupled with less 
price volatility relative to equity markets, possessing the 
smallest average Beta at .61. Because of the inelastic 
nature of the products and services provided, Utilities 
companies do not need the same type of balance sheet 
cash cushion required in other economic sectors, 
allowing them to possess the lowest average quick and 
current ratios of any sector at .85 and .93, respectively.  
Note: The number in parenthesis below the sector name indicates the number of companies in our sample. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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5. WHAT IS DRIVING THE DISCREPANCIES IN ESG SCORES? 
Understanding what drives these discrepancies is essential to make sense of them. Not having access to 
the raw data or the detailed methodologies employed by the different ESG rating agencies, our analysis of 
their disagreement relies on an indirect approach that uses publicly available information. It consists of 
three steps: 
1. Collection of publicly available ESG and other indicators for the firms studied. A total of 
207 ESG indicators (58 related to environmental factors, 70 to social factors, and 79 to 
corporate governance factors), as well as 35 financial variables and information on both 
headquarters location and economic sector.16  
2. Estimation of the relation between the ESG ratings and the explanatory variables. 
Standard econometric techniques cannot easily handle a large number of variables, and they 
usually require specifying a particular structure on the relationships among variables. As an 
alternative, we use a machine learning technique called random forest. Random forest models 
can accommodate complex, non-linear patterns and can handle different types of variables 
efficiently.17  
3. Comparison of the estimation results across ratings. Estimation results look at three 
distinct and complementary angles: (i) the variables’ ability to predict the ESG scores, (ii) their 
contribution to the ratings predicted by our estimation, and (iii) the importance of the 
variables’ interaction when predicting the ESG scores. Exercises (i) and (ii) tell us how 
informative individual variables are regarding the content of the ratings. On the other hand, 
(iii) tells us something about how that information is aggregated into a single score (not how 
agencies actually do it, but how it is done in terms of the estimated relations between ratings 
and explanatory variables). Finally, we compare the disagreement among the predicted ESG 
ratings with the one observed among the agencies’ ratings.   
                                                 
 16. The data were collected from Refinitiv-Eikon, a major provider of financial news and information. A detailed list of all the explanatory 
variables is provided in available upon request. 
17. In contrast to other algorithms, random forest models also generate an internal measure of the model’s ability to predict previously 
unseen observations, thereby eliminating the need to use a separate dataset to evaluate their performance. 
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BOX 3. RANDOM FOREST MODELS: A PRIMER 
A random forest is a machine learning algorithm. It combines the outcomes of a large number of 
individual decision trees to generate a single prediction, either by calculating the average (when the 
prediction variable is continuous) or by implementing a “majority vote” (when the prediction variable is 
categorical). Unsurprisingly, the model is called a forest because it relies on a multiplicity of decision trees. 
But what exactly is a decision tree? Why do we need many of them? And in what sense is the forest 
random?  
A decision tree is a predictive algorithm that, as its name implies, uses a tree-like structure to predict the 
value of a target variable using a set of explanatory variables. A decision tree starts with a single node, 
which then branches into possible outcomes based on the value of one of the explanatory variables. 
Each of those outcomes leads to additional nodes, which once again branch off into other possibilities 
based on another explanatory variable, giving it a tree-like shape. This process continues until a terminal 
node is reached, which leads to no additional sub-nodes and contains our prediction for the variable of 
interest. Decisions regarding what explanatory variables to use at each node, and how to use them to 
split the tree, are taken sequentially (from top to bottom) and are based on the gain in precision 
induced by the split. 
Although decision trees provide a very intuitive modeling approach, they tend to perform poorly when 
predicting previously unseen observations (i.e., observations that were not used to estimate the model). 
This poor performance occurs because decision trees suffer from a problem called “high variance.” Since 
decision tree models are incredibly flexible, they tend to overfit the data used to estimate them. As a 
result, decision trees tend to capture not only the actual relationship between predictors and outcome 
but also the noise contained in the sample (which results in poor predictive performance). 
Various techniques (such as pruning, minimum node size, and maximum number of terminal nodes) can 
mitigate overfitting, but estimating a random forest is one of the most common approaches. The basic 
idea is simple: By combining many “imperfect” decision trees, we can “average out” their individual 
mistakes and dramatically improve the accuracy of our predictions. This approach, however, requires that 
each decision tree in the forest be different so that it provides new information. It is here where the 
“random” part of the model becomes relevant. Ideally, we would like to estimate each decision tree using 
a different sample from the population of interest; this is rarely feasible. Instead, we can achieve something 
similar by injecting randomness into the tree-growing process by doing the following: 1) estimating each 
tree using a different random sample with replacement drawn from the original dataset, and 2) deciding 
how to split a node and limiting the search to a randomly selected subset of explanatory variables. 
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5.1. IS IT ABOUT THE DATA?  
We use data publicly available on the firms to identify what information the ESG ratings are capturing. 
Although these variables do not necessarily coincide with those employed by the rating agencies, we can 
expect them to be related to the various ESG ratings—and, therefore, to be representative of their 
content. Furthermore, using the same variables across the ratings allows us to indirectly assess the impact 
of standardizing the information. 
5.1.1. VARIABLE’S PREDICTIVE POWER18 
One way to do that is by assessing the ability of the explanatory variables, individually or grouped, to 
predict the rating agencies’ ESG scores. 
Table 5. Top 10 Predictors for ESG Scores 
Thomson Reuters RobecoSAM Sustainalytics 
Environmental Variables 
 Target Emissions 
 Resource Reduction Policy  
 Emissions Policy 
 Environmental Supply Chain 
Management  
 Environmental Supply Chain 
Policy  
 Environment Management 
Training  
 Energy Efficiency Policy 
 Target Emissions 
 Renewable Energy Use   
 Resource Reduction 
Targets 
 Target Emissions 
 Renewable Energy Use 
 Environmental Supply Chain 
Management  
 Policy Environmental Supply 
Chain 
 Resource Reduction Targets 
                                                 
18. Our analysis is based on two of the most widely used measures, Mean Decrease in Impurity and Perturbation Importance, using Li 
et al. (2019) and Breiman (2001), respectively.  
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Social Variables 
 Flexible Working Hours  Fundamental Human 
Rights 
 Human Rights Contractor 
 Human Rights Policy 
 Fundamental Human Rights 
 Human Rights Contractor 
Governance Variables 
 Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reporting 
 Independent Board 
Members 
 Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reporting 
 Stakeholder Engagement 
 Global Compact Signatory 
 Board Gender Diversity 
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting 
 Stakeholder Engagement 
 Global Compact Signatory 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
 
First, focusing on the top 10 variables with the highest predictive power for each of the ESG scores, Table 
5 shows that: 19  
- The factors have different predictive power across the ratings. Although environmental factors 
seem to be important predictors for all three ESG scores, they are disproportionally so for Thomson 
Reuter. By contrast, RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics appear to offer a more balanced picture across 
environmental, social, and governance indicators.   
                                                 
19. The top predictors were chosen by ranking all explanatory variables in ascending order according to each of our two measures 
and selecting the first 10 variables to appear in both rankings. 
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- Very few factors overlap across the three ratings. Of the top ten predictors, only two are common 
among all rating providers: Target Emissions and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting.20 However, 
RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics share eight common top predictors. 
Second, we extend the analysis to all variables. To do so, we aggregate them in categories when assessing 
how well they predictive the different ratings. Figure 6 reports the outcome when considering five broad 
categories: environmental, social, governance, financial, and others. Figure 7 expands the analysis to 18 
subcategories: three environmental, four social, three governance, six financial, and two related to other 
factors.  
  The overall environmental and governance factors have the highest predictive power for all 
three ESG scores. Social and financial considerations—in no particular order—follow, and then 
other factors. 
 Emissions and Resource Use have the most predictive power for environmental factors. 
Emissions refers to variables that measure a company’s commitment and effectiveness in reducing 
environmental emissions in production and operational processes. Resource Use refers to variables 
that reflect a company’s performance and capacity to reduce the use of materials, energy, or water, 
and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain management. The subcategory 
Innovation, which includes variables that reflect a company’s capacity to reduce its environmental 
impact through new environmental technologies and processes, shows little power.  
 CSR Strategy and Management capture most of the predictive power of governance factors 
across the ratings.21 Yet Management is significantly more relevant than CSR Strategy in predicting 
Sustainalytics’ ESG scores. The results also confirm our previous finding that the relative importance 
of environmental variables is significantly higher for Thomson Reuters than for the other two rating 
agencies. 
                                                 
20. Target Emissions measures whether a company has set and achieved short-term and long-term targets to reduce emissions to 
land, air, or water from business operations. Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting measures a company’s efforts to publish a 
report on Corporate Social Responsibility, Health and Safety, or Sustainability issues. 
21. CSR Strategy includes variables that reflect a company’s practices to communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social 
and environmental dimensions into its daily decision-making processes. On the other hand, Management includes variables that 
measure a company’s commitment toward and effectiveness in following best practice corporate governance principles. 
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 Among social variables, Human Rights and Workforce have the highest predictive power 
across all agencies. Product Responsibility has the lowest.22 However, while Workforce is the most 
critical social subcategory for Thomson Reuter, Human Rights is the top predictor for RobecoSAM 
and Sustainalytics.  
 
                                                 
22 . Human Rights include variables that measure a company’s effectiveness towards respecting the fundamental human rights 
conventions. Workforce refers to variables that reflect a company’s effectiveness towards job satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, 
maintaining diversity and equal opportunities and development opportunities for its workforce. Product Responsibility includes 
variables that reflect a company’s capacity to produce quality goods and services integrating the customer’s health and safety, integrity, 
and data privacy. 
Figure 6. Predictive Power by Category 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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Figure 7. Predictive Power by Subcategory 
 
a)  Measure 1: Mean Decrease in Impurity 
 
b)  Measure 2: Perturbation Impurity 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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5.1.2. VARIABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
The other way to identify what information the ESG ratings are capturing is to evaluate how much each 
variable contributes to the predicted ESG rating. To do so, we use the predictive power of the variables to 
generate new ESG ratings. We then estimate the actual contribution of each group of variables to these 
predicted ESG ratings. Figure 8 reports the results for the categories and Figure 9 for the subcategories.23 
Ultimately, this allows us to identify how much the different factors matter when calculating the various 
ratings, based on the information derived from the machine learning analysis: 
 Governance and financial variables are the top two contributors for all three ratings. 
Governance is the category whose importance is robust across the two analyses: prediction 
power of a category and contribution to the predicted score. Yet, its magnitude varies 
significantly across rating providers.  
 Management and CSR Strategy drive the contribution of governance, in line with the 
previous analysis. Yet, CSR Strategy contributes negatively to the predicted Sustainalytics 
score.  
 Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement drive the contribution of financial variables. 
And both are negatively related to the predicted Sustainalytics score. 
 Environment variables are still important for the predicted Thomson Reuters score, 
especially Emissions and Resources Use. 
 Workforce remains an important sub-category for social variables, in line with the 
previous analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23. See Appendix 7 for more details on how variable contributions are calculated. 
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Figure 8. Contribution to Predicted ESG Scores by Category 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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Figure 9. Contribution to Predicted ESG Scores by Subcategory 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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5.2. IS IT ABOUT THE METHODS? 
Beyond the variables, the methods for aggregating the information differ from one rating to another. We 
illustrate this point by looking at how the variables interact. Finally, we show how challenging it is for 
investors to understand and rationalize the discrepancies across ESG scores by comparing the rating we 
have generated with the one provided by the agencies. 
 
5.2.1. VARIABLE INTERACTIONS 
Looking at the interaction among variables or groups of variables helps explain how the ways agencies 
aggregate information impacts ratings. We use the estimated random forests to determine whether—and 
to what extent—the different explanatory variables interact with each other when predicting the ESG 
scores. The overall interaction (see Figures 10 and 11) is different across the ratings, especially at the 
subcategory level. For example, while the overall interaction effects of environmental variables are 
concentrated on the subcategory Resource Use for the predicted Thomson Reuters and RobecoSAM 
ratings, they appear to be (roughly) evenly divided between Emission and Resource Use for Sustainalytics. 
Similarly, although the overall interaction effects associated with governance variables seem to be 
concentrated on the subcategory Management for the predicted Sustainalytics rating, they are more 
evenly distributed between Management and Shareholders for RobecoSAM and (to a lesser extent) for 
Thomson Reuters. 
Figures 12 and 13 focus on the pairwise interaction by category and subcategories.24 These pairwise 
effects measure the extent to which variables belonging to one group interact with variables in another 
group. As expected, the results show significant differences across rating agencies. For the predicted 
Thomson Reuters rating, for example, most pairwise interaction effects are relatively weak and evenly 
distributed across categories and subcategories.  
By contrast, pairwise interaction effects appear to be relatively larger and more concentrated for the other 
two predicted ratings. In the case of RobecoSAM, the most substantial pairwise interaction effects are 
between financial and governance variables (especially between Valuation and Management), within 
                                                 
24. Following Friedman and Popescu (2008), we estimate variable interaction effects by decomposing the prediction function into main 
and interaction effects and measuring how much the variance in the model’s predictions depends on the latter. 
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financial variables (driven by the interaction between Balance Sheet and Operating Metrics), between 
environmental and social variables (mostly driven by the interaction between Emissions and Product 
Responsibility), and between finance variables and other (Valuation and Location). 
Similarly, for the predicted Sustainalytics rating, there are significant interaction effects between 
governance and environment (Management and Resource Use), governance and finance (Human Rights 
and Balance Sheet), and within governance (variables in the Management subcategory).  
Perhaps surprisingly, the interaction between Classification (which includes a company’s economic sector) 
and all the environmental, social, and governance subcategories appears to be very weak. This result is at 
odds with the use of sector-specific methodologies, a claim made by all three rating agencies in our 
sample.25 
Our analysis uses standardized data to show how information processing matters for the ratings. Yet 
harmonization of the methods is not necessarily the solution. Not being able to reconcile the ratings due 
to their different data treatment is not an issue as long as the differences reflect the rating agencies’ 
priorities, emphasizing the ESG issues they deem most important. If that is the case, these choices must be 
shared with the rating users, investors, or firms, which will decide which rating is more aligned with their 
priorities. 
                                                 
25. See Gaffuri (2017, p.11), Sutainalytics (2019, p. 5-6), and Thomson Reuters (2018, p.6).  
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Figure 10. Overall Interaction Strength by Category 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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Figure 11. Overall Interaction Strength by Subcategory 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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5.3.   RATINGS: OBSERVED VERSUS GENERATED  
To conclude our analysis, we check the ability of the generated ratings to replicate the level of 
disagreement between the actual ESG rating of the agencies. Comparing predicted and observed levels of 
disagreement offers valuable information to investors: It captures the difficulty in predicting and 
understanding the discrepancies across ESG scores based on information readily available to market 
participants. 
 
Table 6 reports correlation coefficients for each possible pair of ESG scores as predicted by the estimated 
random forests and as observed in the data. For all three pairs, the correlations between predicted scores 
are greater than those observed in the agencies’ ESG ratings. Using similar data while allowing for 
different methods to process it strengthens the convergence across the ratings, confirming that using 
standardized data will lead to more comparable ratings.26 
 
 
 
                                                 
26. Novick (2020). 
Table 6. Correlations between ESG Ratings: Observed and Predicted  
 
Observed ESG Scores  Predicted ESG Scores  
RobecoSAM vs. Sustainalytics 0.72 0.87 
RobecoSAM vs. Thomson Reuters 0.65 0.82 
Sustainalytics vs. Thomson Reuters 0.65 0.79 
Note: The correlations are the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Rating providers’ inconsistencies and the inability to compare their findings often confuse investors. While 
differences across ESG scores can naturally emerge if rating providers adopt different definitions of ESG 
performance, our analysis shows that differences arise even when the rating agencies use similar 
definitions. Thus, the focus when it comes to ESG ratings should not be on agreeing on a single definition 
but on standardizing the data, achieving greater clarity in labeling ratings, and making their objectives 
more transparent. 
Our analysis illustrates how difficult it is to understand or predict the ratings. It shows that most 
discrepancies among rating providers cannot be easily explained by information readily available to 
investors or other users of these ratings. Yet two clear outcomes emerge: 
- The three ratings strongly agree on who are the worst performers, with a correlation higher than 0.95. 
- The three ratings reach some consensus when measuring risks arising from governance factors, 
especially for Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy and Management. The first subcategory of 
governance includes variables that reflect a company’s practices to communicate that it integrates 
economic (financial), social, and environmental concerns into its daily decision-making. The second 
one includes variables that measure a company’s commitment toward and effectiveness in following 
best practice and corporate governance principles. 
 
Overall, our study has two main implications in assessing how well-equipped firms are to deal with ESG 
risks. First, there is a need for data standardization. The use of standardized data will help to reconcile the 
ratings, at least partially. The first step will be to agree on common disclosure standards and to align the 
different existing ESG disclosure standards worldwide. The resulting harmonization of the data would 
reduce the reporting burden on the firms and increase the quality of the information collected. This will 
increase the firms’ participation while improving the rating agencies’ credibility with investors. 
Creating consistent, high-quality data is only part of the solution. The second implication of our study is 
the importance of transparency regarding the methodologies to calculate the rating or the focus of the 
rating. Are E, S, and G factors equally important? Or is the rating focusing mostly on one of them? Our 
study highlights the importance of rating agencies’ different methodologies for aggregating data and 
their impact on the ratings. Rating agencies’ different emphases can be informative by reflecting the ESG 
issues that agencies deem most important. But the agencies must be transparent about their methods 
with investors, firms, and other users who can then decide which rating most aligns with their priorities. 
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APPENDIX 1. NUMBER OF ESG-FOCUSED FUNDS 
Table A.1: Number of ESG-Focused Funds in Largest Asset Management Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
# of Funds (All 
Share Classes) 
# of ESG Funds Percentage ESG 
BlackRock 1038 18 1.73% 
Prudential Financial 322 0 0.00% 
Fidelity 318 5 1.57% 
Morgan Stanley 262 7 2.67% 
Vanguard 207 6 2.90% 
Bank of New York Mellon 205 8 3.90% 
JP Morgan Asset Management 197 2 1.02% 
PIMCO 146 14 9.59% 
State Street 140 2 1.43% 
Amundi 136 5 3.68% 
Goldman Sachs 104 2 1.92% 
Capital Group 62 0 0.00% 
Allianz 51 3 5.88% 
UBS 26 4 15.38% 
AXA Group 10 0 0.00% 
 
Note: Funds classified as ESG explicitly stated in their mandates that investments were chosen primarily for their ESG-risk mitigating 
characteristics. Keywords in the primary investment mandate also included impact investing, gender/ethnic diversification, and 
environmental sustainability. 
 
Source: Morningstar Direct (2020) 
37* 
APPENDIX 2. ROE AND BETA BY ESG SCORE DECILE
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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Figure A.1.a: Thomson Reuters' Roe and Beta by ESG Score 
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Figure A.1.b: RobecoSAM's Roe and Beta by ESG Score 
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Figure A.1.c: Sustainalytics' Roe and Beta by ESG Score 
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APPENDIX 3. DISAGREEMENT AMONG RATINGS AND MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
The analysis in the main text indicates that the extent of disagreement among ESG ratings varies 
substantially. To better understand what is driving this heterogeneity, this appendix shows correlations for 
each pair of ESG scores after dividing companies into deciles based on their market capitalization. Figure 
A.2 below shows the results of the exercise. First, consistent with our previous findings (both when we 
pool all firms and when we divide them by economic sector), RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics exhibit the 
highest pairwise correlation across market capitalization deciles. Second, all pairwise correlations follow a 
relatively similar pattern as we move from companies with low market capitalization to companies with 
high market capitalization. Third, the relationship between the (average) level of agreement among 
ratings and the level of market capitalization is not monotonic. The level of agreement among rating 
agencies appears to be slightly higher for companies with intermediate levels of market capitalizations 
(i.e., deciles 4, 5, and 6) than for companies with low or high levels (especially those in deciles 2, 7, and 10). 
The results suggest no clear relationship between the level of market capitalization and the degree of 
agreement among rating agencies in our sample. 
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APPENDIX 4. DISAGREEMENT AMONG RATINGS AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
Figure A.3 explores how disagreement varies across individual firms. It shows correlations between ESG 
scores after grouping companies based on an individual measure of “disagreement among rating 
agencies.”27 Surprisingly, the results reveal that the extent of the inconsistencies among rating providers 
varies substantially across firms. Indeed, if disagreement among agencies were roughly constant across all 
companies, the curve in Figure A.3 would be relatively flat. Instead, the average correlation between ESG 
scores increases from a value of about 0 (for companies in the first decile) to a value slightly above 0.9 (for 
companies in the top decile).  
                                                 
27. To calculate our firm-level measure of disagreement, we first normalize all ESG scores by subtracting their respective means and 
dividing them by their respective standard deviations. For each company in our sample, we then calculate the mean of the absolute 
value of the normalized scores across all three rating agencies. The resulting number is our firm-level measure of disagreement. For 
a similar exercise, see Berg et al. (2019). 
Figure A.2. Correlations between ESG Scores by Market Capitalization Decile 
 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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As discussed in section four, economic sectors explain part of the variation in disagreement across firms. 
Figure A.4, which plots the distributions of ESG scores after grouping companies based on our firm-
specific measure of disagreement, offers two additional insights. First, as the firm-level measure of 
inconsistencies increases, ESG scores move away from their respective means (i.e., the vertical dotted 
lines). Thus, the level of agreement among ratings appears to be higher for companies whose scores are 
away from the mean (i.e., “relatively good” and “relatively bad” firms) than it is for companies whose 
scores are close to the average. Second, for all three rating agencies, most companies in the top decile of 
our firm-specific measure of disagreement have extremely low ESG scores, indicating that the strongest 
agreement among rating providers occurs across the worst performers. 
Figure A.3. Correlations between ESG Scores by Decile (Based on Firm-Specific Measure of 
Disagreement) 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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Figure A.4. ESG Score Distributions by Decile (Based on Firm-Specific Measure of Disagreement) 
 
  
Note: The vertical dotted line represents the overall average score for each of the rating agencies. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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APPENDIX 5. TOP INDIVIDUAL PREDICTORS FOR ESG SCORES 
Variable Category Definition 
Environment 
Management Training 
Environmental 
Does the company train its employees on environmental 
issues? 
 
Environmental Supply 
Chain Management 
Environmental 
Does the company use environmental criteria (ISO 14000, 
energy consumption, etc.) in the selection process of its 
suppliers or sourcing partners? 
Emissions Policy Environmental 
Does the company have a policy to improve emission 
reduction? 
 
Energy Efficiency 
Policy 
Environmental 
Does the company have a policy to improve its energy 
efficiency? 
 
Environmental Supply 
Chain Policy 
Environmental 
Does the company have a policy to include its supply 
chain in its efforts to lessen its overall environmental 
impact? 
Renewable Energy Use Environmental 
Does the company make use of renewable energy? 
 
Resource Reduction 
Policy 
Environmental 
Does the company have a policy for reducing the use of 
natural resources, or to lessen the environmental impact 
of its supply chain? 
Resource Reduction 
Targets 
Environmental 
Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved 
on resource efficiency? 
Target Emissions Environmental 
Has the company set targets or objectives for emission 
reduction? 
Flexible Working 
Hours 
Social 
Does the company claim to provide flexible working 
hours or working hours that promote a work-life 
balance? 
Fundamental Human 
Rights 
Social 
Does the company claim to comply with the fundamental 
human rights convention of the ILO or support the UN 
declaration of human rights? 
Human Rights 
Contractor 
Social 
Does the company report or show to use human rights 
criteria in the selection or monitoring process of its 
suppliers or sourcing partners? 
Human Rights Policy Social 
Does the company have a policy to ensure the respect of 
human rights in general? 
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Board Gender Diversity Governance What is the percentage of females on the board? 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Reporting 
Governance 
Does the company publish a separate corporate social 
responsibility/health and safety/sustainability report or a 
section in its annual report on these issues? 
Global Compact 
Signatory 
Governance 
Has the company signed the UN Global Compact? The 
UN GC is a non-binding United Nations pact to 
encourage businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable 
and socially responsible policies and to report on their 
implementation. 
Independent Board 
Members 
Governance 
What is the percentage of independent board members 
as reported by the company? 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Governance 
Does the company explain how it engages with its 
stakeholders? How does it involve the stakeholders in its 
decision-making process?  
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APPENDIX 6. VARIABLE SUBCATEGORIES 
Category Subcategory Subcategory Definition 
Environmental Emissions 
Variables that measure a company’s commitment and 
effectiveness towards reducing environmental emissions 
in its production and operational processes. 
Environmental Innovation 
Variables that reflect a company’s capacity to reduce the 
environmental costs and burdens for its customers, 
thereby creating new market opportunities through new 
environmental technologies and processes or eco-
designed products. 
Environmental Resource Use 
Variables that reflect a company’s performance and 
capacity to reduce the use of materials, energy, or water, 
and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving 
supply chain management. 
Social Community  
Variables that reflect a company’s commitment to being 
a good citizen, protecting public health, and respecting 
business ethics. 
Social Human Rights  
Variables that reflect a company’s effectiveness in 
respecting fundamental human rights conventions. 
Social Product Responsibility  
Variables that reflect a company’s capacity to produce 
quality goods and services, integrating the customer’s 
health and safety, integrity, and data privacy. 
Social Workforce  
Variables that measure a company’s effectiveness in 
providing job satisfaction, providing a healthy and safe 
workplace, maintaining diversity and equal opportunities, 
and developing opportunities for its workforce. 
Governance CSR Strategy  
Variables that reflect a company’s practices to 
communicate that it integrates economic (financial), 
social, and environmental dimensions into its daily 
decision-making processes. 
Governance Management  
Variables that measure a company’s commitment and 
effectiveness towards following best practice corporate 
governance principles. 
Governance Shareholders  
Variables that measure a company’s effectiveness 
towards equal treatment of shareholders and the use of 
anti-takeover devices. 
Financial Balance Sheet 
Variables that reflect a company’s assets, liabilities, and 
shareholders’ equity. 
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Financial Cash Flow Statement 
Variables that summarize the amount of cash and cash 
equivalents entering and leaving a company. 
Financial Income Statement 
Variables that measure a company’s revenues and 
expenses during a period. Variables also indicating how 
the revenues are transformed into the net income or net 
profit. 
Financial Operating Metrics 
Variables that illustrate a company’s overall performance, 
such as return on equity, return on assets, and EBITDA. 
Financial Trading Statistics 
Variables that reflect the trading of a company’s stock, 
such as monthly Sharpe Ratio, volatility, institutional 
ownership, 200-day price PCT change, and liquidity 
measures. 
Financial Valuation Metrics 
Variables that reflect and are related to a company’s 
valuation, such as market capitalization, enterprise value, 
P/E ratio, P/EG ratio, Beta, and dividend yield. 
Others Classification 
Economic sector, according to the Thomson Reuters 
Business Classification. 
Others Location 
Country of headquarters, also known as Country of 
Domicile. 
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APPENDIX 7. CALCULATING VARIABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
To understand how variable contributions are calculated in a random forest model, notice that given a set 
of independent variables or predictors, we can estimate how the value of the prediction changes after 
every split in each decision tree. Since each split is associated with a variable, and since the split either 
adds or subtracts to the predicted value given in the previous node, the final prediction can be boiled 
down to the sum of the variable contributions plus the “bias” (i.e., the model’s prediction at the beginning 
of the decision tree). After averaging all the individual decision trees in the random forest model, the final 
prediction can be represented by the following formula: 
prediction(x) = bias + contribution(1, x) + … + contribution(n, x) 
where 
▪ x is a set of predictors, 
▪ bias is the model’s prediction before using any predictor (usually the mean of the variable we 
want to predict in the original dataset),  
▪ contribution (j, x) is the contribution of variable j to the final prediction, and 
▪ n is the number of predictors. 
Although the previous expression is superficially similar to a linear regression, the coefficients of a linear 
regression are fixed, with a single constant for every variable. For the random forest model, by contrast, 
each variable’s contribution is a complex function, one that also depends on all other variables that 
together determine the decision path that generates the prediction, and thus, the contributions that are 
passed along the way. 28 
 
                                                 
28. For a detailed discussion of the methodology, see https://blog.datadive.net/interpreting-random-forests/. 
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APPENDIX 8. OBSERVED VERSUS GENERATED RATINGS AND FIRMS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
In this appendix, we explore whether our model’s ability to account for the disagreement among ESG 
rating agencies varies with some of the firms’ characteristics. To this end, we divide companies by 
economic sector and market capitalization decile and then compare the mean and median correlations 
between the ESG scores observed in the actual data with those predicted by the random forest models. 
Figures A.4(a) and A.5(a) show the results of the exercise. The results suggest that the random forests do a 
reasonably good job at capturing variations in the level of disagreement among ratings across sectors and 
market capitalization deciles but that they tend to underpredict the level itself. Thus, the figures indicate 
that the importance of factors not captured by the random forests in explaining the disagreement among 
ratings remains significant across all economic sectors and market capitalization deciles. This last point is 
confirmed by Figures A.4(b) and 4.5(b), which display the fraction of disagreement explained by the 
random forest models for each economics sector and market capitalization decile. The figures show that 
the ability of the random forests to account for the disagreement among agencies ranges from 45.2 
percent to 67.3 percent across economic sectors and from 46.6 percent to 59.5 percent across market 
capitalization. Although the specific numbers may vary, the overall picture seems to confirm that the 
models can account for around half the observed disagreement among rating agencies. 
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Figure A.4. Explanatory Power of Random Forest Models by Economic Sector 
 
    a) Predicted versus Observed Correlations                                  b) % of Disagreement Explained 
by RF Models between ESG Scores       
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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Figure A.5. Explanatory Power of Random Forest Models by Market Capitalization Decile 
 
    a) Predicted versus Observed Correlations                                    b) % of Disagreement Explained 
by RF Models between ESG Scores 
       
  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data (2020) 
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